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In the case of circumstantial prosecution, an unbreakable chain of circumstantial evidence examined in mutual connection should lead to a compelling conclusion about the defendant's perpetration despite a lack of direct evidence thereof.
I. Th is judgment has been rendered on the grounds of the following facts.
V.B. was tried on the charge of attempted importation of a considerable amount of intoxicated substances in the form of 93,084.52 kg of heroin on 8 March 2014 into the territory of Poland across the Polish border in Dorohusk acting jointly and in mutual cooperation with other persons. Heroin was hidden in a deliberately made cubby-hole located in the Volvo truck tractor's trailer. V.B. 's plan failed because he was rejected entry into Poland by the Border Customs Service and his car was seized by the Border Guard offi cers, i.e. he was charged with the commission of an act under Art. 13 § 1 of the Criminal Code in connection with Art. 55 par. 3 of the Act of 29 July 2005 on Counteracting Drug Addiction.
Regional Court in (…) found the defendant guilty as charged in the judgment of 30 January 2015 in the case IV K …/14, eliminating complicity from the description of the attributed act and sentencing him to ten years of deprivation of liberty.
Th e judgment was challenged in the appeal submitted by the defendant's three defence counsels.
Without getting into details of the claims raised by the defendant's three defence counsels in the appeal (concerning mainly the violation of the principle of free assessment of evidence and error as to the established facts), it should be acknowledged that the Court of Appeal in (…) modifi ed the judgment under appeal on 14 July 2015 in the case II AKa …/15 by reducing the defendant's sentence to seven years imprisonment upholding in force the remaining part of the judgment under appeal.
Th e defence counsels objected in the cassation against the above judgment of the court of appeal that the court, among others, did not examine the appeal's claims pointing to the regional court's failure to fulfi l the directives of assessment of evidence and presumptive evidence in the absolutely circumstantial case, which lacked at least one evidence proving that V.B. had been aware of the trailer wall's reconstruction and hiding drugs there, failure to check the lapse of the defendant's ban on entry to Poland, failure to consider if the poor driver maintaining two children of an impeccable opinion, with clean criminal record and without contacts with the so called dregs of society could have so much money as to purchase a considerable amount of one of the most expensive drugs in the world and travel around Europe and Asia delivering his cargo fearing nothing and not hiding at all being totally unaware of alleged smuggling of a considerable amount of drugs and not feeling guilty of anything . Moreover, the Defence claimed that it would be impossible to establish the defendant's awareness (without complicity with the third parties, which was eliminated by the regional court from the description of the act attributed to the defendant) of building in a cubby-hole in his vehicle where drugs were hidden from the materials (the expert witness confi rmed that these were plastic pipes manufactured outside the EU on the specifi cally established date) the defendant was not able to access.
Hearing the cassation, the Supreme Court decided it was fully grounded within the scope of gross infringement of Art. 433 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in connection with Art. 457 § 3 of the CCP claimed by the Defence. Th e Court decided that the appellants were absolutely right saying that the claims made by the defence counsels in the appeals were examined very superfi cially in a manner "pretending their consideration", that is with the gross infringement of Art. 433 § 2 of the CCP. Th e Supreme Court held that both the courts hearing the case and the parties to the proceedings alike had agreed that the case was circumstantial. In the SC's opinion, such a conclusion implied, above all, the requirement of diligence in analyzing the collected evidence. Th e Court underlined that it is traditionally assumed in such cases that an unbreakable chain of circumstantial evidence examined in mutual connection should lead to a compelling conclusion about the defendant's perpetration despite a lack of direct evidence thereof. Reversing the court of appeal's judgment, the Supreme Court pointed out what evidence should have been taken (among others, hearing of CBŚ offi cers) to assure that the case's resolution satisfi ed the standards of a fair trial.
II. Th e Supreme Court's glossed judgment evokes the analysis of opinions held
by the doctrine and court case law as to the essence of circumstantial evidence and circumstantial trials. While generally accepting this judgment's thesis, we may fi nd there at least the following assumptions.
First of all, it defi nes the case of "a circumstantial nature" where direct evidence does not exist.
Secondly, the Supreme Court notices that in such a case an unbreakable chain of circumstantial evidence must lead to a compelling conclusion about the defendant's perpetration.
1.
Referring to the fi rst statement, it should be noticed that the doctrine of a criminal trial traditionally distinguishes the so called direct evidence and indirect (circumstantial) evidence in the classifi cation of evidence. Th e fi rst group embraces evidence upon which a basic fact can be proven directly through deductive reasoning, which is logically reliable, whereas circumstantial evidence relies on the method of reductive reasoning, allowing to reconstruct facts upon presumptive evidence of the actual chain of prosecuted criminal events 2 . Z. Papierkowski's defi nition should be recognized as still up-to-date; according to it, "presumptive evidence is constructed in such a way that certain circumstances which are not directly connected with the crime have been proved while genuineness of a basic fact being the object of prosecution may be confi rmed only aft erwards"
3 . In the post-war subject literature, M. Cieślak claimed that direct evidence is directly aimed at proving a basic fact. On the other hand, presumptive evidence proves a basic fact through one piece of evidence or a larger number of evidence 4 . In his opinion, presumptive evidence is closer to derivative evidence because in both cases there is some agent between evidence and a basic fact. "A diff erence between them is the fact that in derivative evidence an additional source of evidence is an agent whereas in indirect evidence this additional element is just a piece of evidence, i.e. presumptive evidence constituting a key notion herein. Similar to the sources of evidence in derivative multifaceted evidence, presumptive evidence may be put in a chain of subsequently linked elements thus distancing an investigator from the main fact. Due to this, with regard to indirect evidence, we may also talk about their multifaceted nature depending on a number of criminal evidence being indirect elements thereof " M. Cieślak emphasized that a manner of reasoning in direct and indirect evidence is similar: "in both cases proving is indirect learning, reasoning going from known consequences to unknown truths while evidence is this necessary agent linking procedural body's awareness with the fact under examination. With regard to indirect evidence, a course of procedural body's reasoning, however, becomes more complicated because an addition element is introduced" 6 .
2.
Hence the Supreme Court's assumption that a lack of indirect evidence decides about "a circumstantial nature of a case" must be considered. In this context, it should be noticed that the post-war subject literature also discusses the essence of a circumstantial trial as proceedings based not only fully but also partially on presumptive evidence.
According to L. Peiper, a circumstantial trial may be divided into three types of proceedings with regard to presumptive evidence 7 : 1) proceedings based exclusively on the evidence provided by the eyewitnesses of an act, 2) proceedings based exclusively on presumptive evidence, 3) proceedings based both on the eyewitnesses of an act and presumptive evidence.
L. Peiper called the last type of proceedings as a mixed trial where a verdict may eventually be passed exclusively upon presumptive evidence, e.g. when a court fi nds witnesses' evidence uncertain or not credible for other reasons and carries out the assessment of presumptive evidence collected in the case.
3.
In any case, it should be noticed that the Supreme Court's case law consistently refers the notion of a circumstantial trial solely to cases where there is no direct evidence while the defendant's perpetration and guilt is exclusively decided upon indirect evidence.
Th e Supreme Court's judgment of 24 April 1975, II KR 364/74 8 , which was passed still under the CCP of 1969, had a considerable impact on defi ning the essence of a criminal trial, which was specifi ed as follows:
"A circumstantial trial should be understood as a trial where there are no direct proofs of guilt, presumptive evidence is not complete -there are only circumstances upon which guilt may be merely speculated about; whereas explanations of codefendants confi rming specifi c facts proving the defendant's guilt are not presumptive evidence but direct evidence while the assessment of their credibility does not aff ect their nature". Commenting this judgment, Z. Doda and A. Gaberle ascertained that the interpretation proposed by the Supreme Court accurately specifi es the essence of "a circumstantial trial", but they also noticed that the SC uses the term of "presumptive evidence" to designate diff erent things, namely "evidence" and "a piece of evidence". According to these authors, " presumptive evidence" is by all means not "evidence" because it is "a piece of evidence" implied by "indirect evidence" ("circumstantial evidence"). In respect of "the defendant's explanations", these may be both "direct evidence" and "indirect evidence" depending on the fact whether they refer directly to the basic fact, or whether their subject are merely specifi c pieces of evidence ("presumptive evidence")"
9 . Furthermore, the current court case law adopts a generally "classical" defi nition of a circumstantial trial: "A circumstantial trial lacks direct evidence (at least derivative evidence) whereas fi ndings about the defendant's perpetration of the criminal act he or she is charged with are merely based on indirect evidence (circumstantial)"
10 . It should be noticed that in the current case law, the Supreme Court generally attempts to avoid using a "pejorative" notion of "a circumstantial trial" if apart from presumptive evidence, there is also direct evidence in a criminal case, e.g. when the defendant pleads guilty 11 .
4.
Although the Supreme Court used the term "a case of a circumstantial nature" and not "a circumstantial trial" in the thesis of the glossed judgment, reading the reasons thereto, one comes to the conclusion that this court accepts herein a commonly adopted essence of this trial in its case law. It seems, however, that a diff erent opinion may be assumed in this respect, i.e. defi ning a circumstantial trial as hearing of evidence embracing accidental facts (presumptive evidence).
Hence it may be ascertained that hearing of evidence in such a trial covers both a basic fact and accidental facts while proving them is not an ultimate purpose of proving in this trial 12 . Such a defi nition allows to determine a circumstantial trial in sensu largo, where hearing of evidence is based on both proofs (evidence) referring directly to a basic fact (direct evidence) and indirect evidence permitting to reconstruct presumptive evidence as accidental facts. On the other hand, a circumstantial trial in sensu stricto may be determined as hearing of evidence whose direct subject are accidental facts due to a lack of direct evidence.
Th e above adopted defi nition of a circumstantial trial may be justifi ed by J. Nelken's opinion, who claims that "on the one hand, presumptive evidence is a direct object of hearing of evidence, while on the other hand, it does not belong to the main subject of these proceedings; it is not covered by a basic fact whose establishment is an ultimate purpose of a criminal trial with regard to factual fi ndings. Presumptive evidence "points to" the basic fact just because it is itself beyond the basic fact, somehow outside this fact. Otherwise, it would be diffi cult to talk about a causal connection between presumptive evidence (accidental facts) and the basic fact" 13 . Th is author noticed that a role of presumptive evidence is not merely limited to indirect establishment of a basic fact but it may be a base to create a version of the event and a ground for some procedural actions such as initiating investigation procedure, charging, applying preventive measures, closing investigation procedure, and bringing indictment 14 . Th e above presented possibility of taking advantage of presumptive evidence not only in taking a fi nal decision on the subject of a trial but resolving incidental issues too is a certain argument for placing "a circumstantial trial" in the sphere of hearing evidence rather than extending it for the entire criminal procedure. It may happen that during the investigation procedure (in particular in the in rem phase) a procedural body will only have indirect evidence and, next, it will obtain evidence referring directly to the basic fact.
Th us the notion of a circumstantial trial" adopted in the procedural theory and practice should be treated as certain simplifi cation because it is merely a type of hearing of evidence not being a special type of criminal proceedings. Opposite to special proceedings specifi ed in Section X of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not characterized by any special relation with regard to the formalism of ordinary proceedings 15 . Attempting to determine a mutual relation of the terms "presumptive evidence" and "circumstantial trial", it may be not so insightfully held that a circumstantial trial is a criminal proceeding using the structure of presumptive evidence.
Presumptive evidence in this meaning cannot be identifi ed with a proof but evidence in the meaning of the process of proving in the real and cognitive aspect, i.e. encompassing all factual and legal actions undertaken in order to retrieve, record and use evidence in order to establish accidental facts, and then conclude about a basic fact thereon.
On the other hand, in the contemporary criminal trial, arguments against distinguishing "a circumstantial trial" as a special type of a criminal trial are provided by the principle of free assessment of evidence to be followed in criminal proceedings including a ban on their evaluation 16 .
5.
Th e above considerations evoke the need to comment on the second assumption adopted in the thesis of the glossed judgment and referring to "the conclusive force of evidence" of a circumstantial trial.
Th e subject literature still from the time of validity of the CCP of 1969 pointed out that presumptive evidence must satisfy three conditions to be recognized as the grounds for factual fi ndings 17 : 1) it must prove the existence of a chain of presumptions which will univocally imply the resolution of a basic fact because single and not mutually connected presumptions do not prove anything; 2) the chain of presumptions must be unbreakable and without loopholes, in other words, it may not allow a rational support for yet another version; 3) all presumptive evidence must be credible and all presumptions suggested by this evidence must be proved; there is no place for weak presumptions in the chain of presumptions; a presumption must be either proved or dismissed.
Although the Supreme Court included in the thesis of the glossed judgment expressis verbis only the two fi rst conditions of presumptive evidence's credibility, thorough reading of the reasons thereto allows to conclude that the Court fi nds the requirement of certain proving of each accidental fact to be obvious as well.
Furthermore, in the light of the valid procedural law, which by abandoning a legal theory of evidence does not evaluate any evidence in advance and does not favour some evidence over other, contemporary subject literature acknowledges that guilt may solely be proven upon legally admissible presumptions. For this reason, according to R. Kmiecik, in the so called circumstantial trial, a set of presumptions necessary to prove guilt may not evoke any loopholes or doubts whatsoever, otherwise, in accordance with the principle of in dubio pro reo, the defendant should be acquitted. However, the author further observes that the establishment of presumptions (accidental facts important for evidence) must be formally proved 18 . In this context, the issue of "unbreakability" of a chain of presumptions as a condition of certainty of presumptive evidence built upon them should be briefl y explained. Th e opinion of J. Nelken is worth noticing here, who righty observed that if some presumption (or some presumptions) drops off the chain and all remaining presumptions still allow to construct such a version of the event which excludes other possible versions, then the evidence derived from the presumptions may be found
